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Selected Essays

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123 *TG*, June 1942, p. 18. Anti-Semitism emerges on occasion in these invectives; see Jan. 1942, p. 11; U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, *Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japanese Morale*, p. 240.

124 *TG*, Oct. 1942, p. 24.

125 *TG*, March 1943, p. 17.

126 *TG*, May 1943, pp. 27–28.

127 *TG*, Feb. 1944, p. 15; see U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, *Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japanese Morale*, p. 245.

128 See the treatment of this subject by Kazuko Tsurumi in *Social Change and the Individual: Japan before and after Defeat in World War II* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), and U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, *Summary Report (Pacific War)* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 21.

129 The masses, as one report put it, were beginning to question the unquestionable: "the responsibility of the war leaders and, indirectly, that of the emperor for the present war situation.... [T]here are many cases which advocate the class struggle by extreme expressions of resentment against capitalists and managers of munitions factories, contending that this 'Holy War' is a private war of the militarists and capitalists." U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, *Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japanese Morale*, p. 245.

130 Gaimushō, *Shūsen Shiroku*, p. 357.

131 Hosokawa, *Jōhō Tennō ni Tassezu*, p. 73–74; also Gaimushō, *Shūsen Shiroku*, p. 291. See Dower, *Empire and Aftermath*, pp. 289–90 for Hosokawa, and pp. 292–303 for the manner in which, in conservative eyes, these fears of revolution seemed to be materializing in the early stages of the U.S. occupation of Japan.

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Occupied Japan and the Cold War in Asia

WHEN HARRY TRUMAN succeeded Franklin Roosevelt as president in April 1945, the United States had just begun the systematic, low-level saturation bombing of Japanese cities. In the third month of his administration, the new president received word of the nuclear test at Alamogordo, thought immediately of biblical prophesies of the apocalypse, and immediately approved the use of the atomic bombs against Japan. As he phrased it in his belatedly discovered "Potsdam diary," written at the time he learned about the successful test, the Japanese were "savages, ruthless, merciless and fanatic." In a personal letter written a few days after Hiroshima and Nagasaki had been destroyed, the president explained that "when you have to deal with a beast you have to treat him as a beast." Following Japan's capitulation in mid August 1945, the United States occupied the country as the overwhelmingly dominant force in a nominally "Allied" occupation and proceeded to initiate a rigorous policy of "demilitarization and democratization."[1]

Less than five years later, the Truman administration had identified Japan as the key to the balance of power in Asia—and Asia as capable

of tipping the global balance in the direction of the Soviet Union. Before the outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950, Okinawa had been taken over as the key U.S. nuclear base in the Far East, the runways on airfields in Japan were being lengthened to accommodate the newest U.S. heavy bombers, policy toward occupied Japan had shifted from reform to economic reconstruction, plans were in the air to promote Japanese production of capital goods including military items for export, and the United States was urging Japan to rearm. In addition, policymakers in Washington were in general agreement on the urgent need to integrate Japan and Southeast Asia with one another economically and militarily, as part of a "great crescent" of anticommunist containment in Asia. As a number of contemporary observers noted, some wryly and some bitterly, the Americans seemed to be dusting off Japan's plans of the 1930s and early 1940s to integrate the southern areas in a great "coprosperity sphere," which had brought World War II to Asia in the first place.

In September 1951, the United States and forty-seven other nations signed a nonrestrictive and relatively brief treaty of peace with Japan in San Francisco, thereby (pending ratification by home governments) formally ending the state of war between the Allied Powers and Japan. Simultaneously, as the essential quid pro quo for this "generous" peace treaty on the part of the United States, a bilateral United States–Japan Mutual Security Agreement was signed, permitting the maintenance of U.S. bases throughout sovereign Japan and anticipating future substantial Japanese rearmament. Because of this de facto military rider, the Soviet Union did not sign the peace treaty. Furthermore, because of disagreements among the Allies concerning policy toward China, neither the People's Republic of China nor the Chinese Nationalist regime ensconced in Taiwan were invited to the peace conference. In the months following the San Francisco conference, however, while Japan remained occupied, the conservative government of Yoshida Shigeru was effectively pressured into signing a bilateral peace treaty with the Chinese Nationalists and adhering to the U.S. policy of isolating and economically strangling communist China. In April 1952—eighty months after the end of World War II in Asia—the Occupation of Japan formally ended and Japan reentered the global arena as the key U.S. ally in Asia. The Occupation had lasted almost twice as long as the Pacific War itself.

At the time the Occupation ended, it seemed to most observers, certainly on the Japanese side, to have been an unduly prolonged affair. Indeed, one of the major arguments in Washington for restoring sovereignty to Japan was that further delay would simply erode Japanese goodwill toward the United States and increase the possibility of Japan's sliding toward the Soviet Union. In retrospect, of course, we are inclined to weigh time differently and see this as a relatively short period in which momentous changes took place. In retrospect, too, it is also now apparent that Japan, less than seven years after sacrificing more than two and a half million of its citizens and losing an empire, was about to embark on a period of accelerated economic growth that actually was facilitated by war: by breakthroughs in technology and labor skills that came about in mobilizing for "total war" beginning in the 1930s; by the destruction of old industrial plants in the U.S. air raids of 1944 and 1945, which paved the way for factory reconstruction at more modern and rational levels after 1945; by the stimulation that the Japanese economy received from war-related "special procurements" and "new special procurements" by the United States after the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950; and by the fact that the U.S. policy of incorporating Japan economically as well as militarily into a new Pax Americana in Asia also involved giving Japanese industrialists fairly generous access to U.S. licenses and patents.

This transformation from "savage" enemy to "freedom-loving" ally was breathtaking in many ways. It was not necessarily conceptually or psychologically disorienting to most Americans, however, because much of the basic rhetoric of the World War II years was simply reassigned. Now the communists were portrayed as the savages who were conspiring to conquer the world (U.S. wartime propaganda had insisted not merely that Japan's goal was world conquest but that the Japanese had a "100-year plan" for accomplishing this). More peculiar to the Asian context, the Japanese now donned the "democratic, business-oriented" characteristics that had been assigned to America's wartime Chinese allies, while the Chinese, as communists, suddenly became inherently treacherous and fanatical, robotlike and antlike. The communist Chinese also absorbed much of the racist "Yellow Peril" animosity that had been directed against the Japanese enemy during World War II—now with the overlay, of course, of the "Red Peril" as well.

Even before the Truman administration ended, it was apparent that Japan was the only place in postwar Asia where U.S. policy could reasonably claim success. Judged on its own terms, the Occupation had been unexpectedly amicable; and despite the so-called reverse course that marked the shift in U.S. policies from reform to rehabilitation of Japan as a Cold War ally, many of the initial democratic reforms remained intact. The government of Japan was conservative and staunchly anti-communist. And with the conspicuous exception of the left-wing parties and a good portion of the intelligentsia, who opposed the dilution of reformism and abandonment of the early ideals of demilitarization and neutrality, the Japanese people as a whole also appeared to look favorably on the United States. When Americans looked at the rest of Asia—at China, Korea, and Southeast Asia—Japan could not help but bring a sigh of relief. By comparison with the Soviet presence in Eastern Europe, moreover, Japan could be held up as a model of enlightened "free world" occupation policies.

Until perhaps the end of the 1960s, Western scholarship on U.S. policy toward Japan during the Truman administration tended to dwell on these positive accomplishments and was characterized by several lines of emphasis. The focus was on the occupation of Japan per se and, within this frame, on the positive American contribution to "democratization." The Occupation was presented as a model of enlightened red-white-and-blue "social engineering," as suggested by the title of the most popular book on the subject, Kazuo Kawai's *Japan's American Interlude*, first published in 1960. The "reverse course" was not greatly emphasized (except as a necessary way of preserving the democratic reforms by stabilizing the economy), and the decision to remilitarize Japan was presented largely as a response to a Soviet threat to Japan and Asia. Because Japanese rearmament, the decision to maintain post-treaty U.S. bases in Japan, and the policy of trilateral linkage among Japan, Southeast Asia, and the United States all emerged as formal public policies after the outbreak of the Korean War, it generally was implied that they were responses to that conflict.

More recent scholarship on this period, in Japan as well as in the English-speaking countries, has by no means denied the "democratization" that occurred in postsurrender Japan, but in general it has taken a different tack in approaching occupied Japan as history. In good part,

the revised approach derives from the opening of the U.S. archives on this period, along with a wealth of private papers, reminiscences, oral histories, and the like. To some extent, the new approaches also reflect the questions asked by a younger and more skeptical generation of scholars in the United States, who began to do archival work on early postwar U.S. policy in the wake of the Vietnam War. To risk some grand generalizations, it can be said that recent scholarship on U.S. policy toward Japan in the late 1940s and early 1950s (1) gives greater emphasis to the Japanese contribution to developments in occupied Japan, positive as well as negative, and at the popular as well as official levels; (2) is more attentive to the contribution of "middle-echelon leadership" on both the U.S. and the Japanese sides, as well as to the influence of special-interest groups; (3) places U.S. policy toward occupied Japan firmly in the context of U.S. global policy; (4) traces almost all key strategic policies (such as Japanese remilitarization, U.S. bases in sovereign Japan, and integration of Japan and Southeast Asia) to before the Korean War; (5) emphasizes economic and not just military considerations in U.S. planning for Asia (such as the "dollar gap" crisis of the late 1940s); (6) deemphasizes the fear of a direct Soviet attack on Japan on the part of U.S. planners while elevating the importance assigned to Japan in balance-of-power thinking; and (7) calls attention to some of the more hysterical U.S. proposals for Japan that emerged after the outbreak of the Korean War, such as the demand for a Japanese army of at least 300,000 men and the anticipation that Japan should and would soon emerge as an arsenal of select military items for noncommunist Asia.

The implications of such reinterpretations are substantial. For example, the repressive aspects of the reverse course within the Japanese body politic have become more apparent to Western students and scholars. (They always have been emphasized in Japanese writings on the period.) Also, the fundamentally benign picture of Japan's being remilitarized in response to mounting tensions in Asia is called into question, because it is now apparent that the U.S. policy toward Japan also contributed to tension and confrontation in Asia in particular and in the Cold War in general, especially from 1949 on (that is, before the Korean War and even before the Sino-Soviet pact of February 1950, which is often cited as evidence of the hostile intentions of the communist powers). Perhaps the single most concrete and consequential point that emerges from the

recently opened archives is the extent to which, by the early 1950s, U.S. planners had come to see Japan and Southeast Asia as inseparable parts of the containment strategy. Southeast Asia needed the Japanese "workshop," it was argued, but even more significantly Japan needed secure access to the markets and raw materials of Southeast Asia, especially if it was not going to be allowed to reestablish intimate economic relations with China. When postwar U.S. policy toward Asia is examined from this perspective, Japan emerges as the greatest "domino" of all well before the Geneva Conference of 1954. It is now apparent that the initial U.S. commitment to counterrevolution in Southeast Asia, which eventually proved so tragic, cannot be fully understood without taking Japan into account.[2]

As these observations suggest, a comprehensive study of the policies of the Truman administration toward Japan must move in several directions, encompassing both internal developments in occupied Japan and broader regional and global strategies. In the latter instance, a great deal more is involved than just the projected linkage of Japan and Southeast Asia, for this positive policy naturally developed against the background of reassessing U.S. policy toward China and Korea—developments that have been the subject of a number of recent monographs in English.[3] The regional dimension also involves international considerations of a slightly different order, namely, the response of U.S. allies such as Britain, Australia, and New Zealand to U.S. initiatives involving Japan and the rest of Asia. These countries, too, have opened their diplomatic archives in recent years, and it is more apparent than ever that their cooperation with the U.S. Cold War policy frequently was tempered by grave misgivings. The rearmament of Japan caused shudders throughout noncommunist Asia, to say nothing of the fear provoked in the communist countries. And the unilateral U.S. decision to promote Japanese economic reconstruction was not exactly received gleefully by Japan's former and future economic rivals in Asia. When it became clear that the United States had decided not merely to assist in the economic rehabilitation of Japan but to deflect such projected growth away from China and in the direction of Southeast Asia, the alarm was palpable, especially in London, where such a policy could be seen as yet another potentially devastating blow to the Sterling bloc. From this perspective, U.S. policy toward

Japan also must be seen in the context of the decline of the British empire and the tensions that arose within the Anglo-American camp as the Pax Britannica gave way to a Pax Americana.[4]

Although the transformation of Japan from bitter enemy to Cold War ally may seem natural in retrospect, this reversal of policy did not occur all of a piece; nor was it arrived at without controversy within U.S. decision-making circles; nor was it a policy without ambiguities—including resentment on the part of many Japanese conservatives who felt they were being denied true sovereignty, and lingering doubts on the U.S. side about how far Japan could be trusted. Even as U.S. planners came to assign Japan a crucial role in the global balance of power, in both a negative and positive sense (denying Japan to the Soviet Union's sphere of influence and using Japan against the Soviet "bloc"), they remained nervous about Japan's "ideological" inclinations. Extremists of either the Left or the Right, it was feared, might still assume power in the future. Thus, while the bilateral United States–Japan security treaty signed at San Francisco in 1951 was first and foremost an anticommunist pact, it simultaneously functioned as a vehicle for controlling Japan by perpetuating its military subordination to the United States in every conceivable direction: strategic planning, matériel procurement, technological development, and the continued presence of U.S. forces in and around Japan. Similarly, the security treaties that the United States negotiated with the Philippines and Australia–New Zealand in 1951 also served the double function of assuring these allies of U.S. assistance in the event of either communist or Japanese aggression. At the time they were negotiated, in fact, these parallel security pacts were requested by the Asian nations involved primarily out of alarm at the specter of a remilitarized and revanchist Japan.

From the perspective of Washington, the U.S. relationship with Japan also was plagued by the legacy of one of the early ideals of the Occupation: the pacifist sentiment embodied in the famous "no war" clause (Article Nine) of the new constitution that General Douglas MacArthur and his staff had pressed upon the Japanese in 1946. Although U.S. officials quickly came to lament this dramatic exercise in "demilitarization," the Japanese people as a whole continued to embrace Article Nine, in spirit if not to the letter, and resisted its

abrogation or amendment. Their recollection of the hardships and horrors of the war in Asia and the Pacific remained keen, as did their skepticism of overly zealous appeals to remilitarize in the name of "defense." The symbolic significance of Article Nine in postwar Japanese politics cannot be overemphasized, and Japan's conservative government lost no opportunity to use this in resisting the heavy pressure for rapid remilitarization that the United States exerted after June 1950.

In the pages that follow, the fascinating developments that took place within occupied Japan will be mentioned only in passing; primary attention will be given to Japan's place in the strategic thinking of the Truman administration. Recent country-oriented studies of postwar U.S. policy toward China, Korea, and Southeast Asia as a rule point to the year or so before the Korean War as marking a watershed in U.S. planning. Certainly the documents of the time reveal officials as temperamentally diverse as George Kennan, Dean Rusk, and Louis Johnson all lamenting the "country by country" approach toward Asia that existed in 1949 and into 1950, and it is from this time on that the contours of a more integrated, regional approach to Asia become conspicuous.[5] Strategic policy toward Japan not only fits this pattern but can be analyzed more precisely as having evolved through four stages between the end of the war in 1945 and the end of the Occupation in April 1952: (1) concentration on the "demilitarization and democratization" of Japan and projection of a disarmed and "neutral" Japan in the future (August 1945 to mid 1947); (2) a "soft" Cold War policy, in which primary emphasis was placed on denying Japan to the Soviet sphere (mid 1947 to 1949); (3) a "hard" Cold War policy, in which Japan was assigned a positive, active role in the U.S. anticommunist strategy (mid 1949 to September 1951); and (4) an integrated Cold War policy, in which the concrete mechanisms of regional military and economic integration actually were created—including the peace treaty and various security treaties of 1951–1952, the coordination of U.S. military and economic polices, and the firm commitment to containment of China through the creation of a trilateral nexus linking the United States, Japan, and Southeast Asia (beginning in the latter part of 1951). Obviously, the roots of each "stage" can be found in earlier periods.

DEMILITARIZATION AND DEMOCRATIZATION, 1945–1947

Well before World War II ended, it was widely assumed that the United States would maintain strategic control of the Pacific Ocean—an assumption that was blithely captured at the popular level in a wartime American song entitled "To Be Specific, It's Our Pacific." U.S. military planners gave close attention to the key islands in the Pacific over which they desired to maintain unilateral control indefinitely, but such planning did not extend to Japan per se. Until the final stages of the war, plans for postsurrender Japan anticipated an "Allied" occupation in which the United States would play the leading role, but China, Britain, and possibly the Soviet Union (if it entered the war before Japan surrendered) would all have a serious place.[6]

When Japan's capitulation became a reality, however, the Truman administration took a strong stand against a multinational occupation in any meaningful sense. The United States refused to consider dividing Japan into zones of occupation as had been done in Germany, demanded that all of occupied Japan be placed under a U.S. supreme commander, and balked at the creation of a genuinely influential international control commission. There was some grousing at this on the part of other Allied powers, and the creation of an essentially tokenistic superstructure of international supervision was not completed until early 1946, by which time the bureaucratic apparatus of de facto unilateral U.S. control was firmly in place.[7]

Looking ahead to the rise of Cold War tensions between the United States and Soviet Union, it is noteworthy that Stalin did not make a great issue out of the U.S. assumption of a dominant position in Japan and the Pacific. Although the Soviet Union requested a joint U.S.-Soviet supreme command in Japan, and asked that the northern island of Hokkaido be made a Soviet zone of occupation, Stalin accepted Truman's flat rejection of these requests with little more than a shrug. And although legally entitled to send a Soviet military contingent to Japan as part of the nominally Allied occupation force, the Soviet dictator declined to do so on the grounds that this would inconvenience General Douglas MacArthur, who had been designated supreme commander. In the ex-

changes that took place over the control apparatus for occupied Japan between August 1945 and early 1946, the Soviets gave numerous signals that they hoped the United States would accept their acknowledgment of a legitimate U.S. sphere of interest in Japan and the Pacific as a quid pro quo for American acknowledgment of the Soviet Union's reasonable security concerns in Eastern Europe. This conciliatory stance was consistent with the restraint the Russians displayed in Korea in August 1945, when Stalin held his forces at the thirty-eighth parallel although they could have occupied the entire Korean peninsula easily before the U.S. forces arrived. Stalin's willingness to recognize the Nationalist regime of Chiang Kai-shek as the sole legitimate government of China in August 1945 and to promise eventual withdrawal of Soviet troops from Manchuria also impressed some observers at the time as being unexpectedly conciliatory. As it turned out, the Truman administration was not inclined to acknowledge that there was any comparability in the assumed spheres of influence of the two nations.[8]

Journalistic accounts from the early months of the Occupation often refer to gossip and scuttlebutt concerning Japan as the "staging area for the next war," and it is indeed possible to find U.S. officials who raised the question of Japan's future importance as an anti-Soviet military base at an early date. Navy Secretary James Forrestal turned this matter over in his mind in the early summer of 1945, for example; in the State Department, John Davies introduced the prospect of Japan as a future *place d'armes* in August 1946.[9] The mainstream of U.S. strategic planning for Asia from 1945 to 1947, however, remained grounded in the passions and assumptions of the recent war: notably, hatred and fear of Japan and lingering hope that China would emerge as a strong ally of the United States and capable "policeman" in Asia. Until well into 1946, and in some circles much later, the *place d'armes* men were drowned out by a potent phrase that carried over from the war years, namely, the "permanent and complete" disarmament of Japan. The genealogy of this idealistic rhetoric is beyond the scope of this essay, but it is well to recall how immensely popular it was during the war. President Roosevelt, with characteristic grandiloquence, had declared this to be the Allied goal for both Germany and Japan; Senator Arthur Vandenberg called for "permanently and conclusively and effectively disarming Germany and Japan" in the famous speech of January 1945 in which he announced

his support for a bipartisan foreign policy in the postwar era; the Potsdam Declaration of July projected the "complete disarmament" of Japan; and citizens' lobbies and the media readily embraced the prospect of a permanently defanged Axis foe.[10]

The agenda for Japan was in fact much broader than mere disarmament per se. Until the very eve of Japan's surrender, U.S. military planners still expected that the war in Asia might continue for another year or year and a half. Consequently, they were caught somewhat by surprise by Japan's surrender. Due in good part to the impressive activities of a small State Department group led by Hugh Borton and George Blakeslee of the Far Eastern Division, however, planning for postsurrender Japan at the lower levels of the bureaucracy was in fact well advanced when the war ended. Scores of position papers dealing with specific aspects of the Japanese state and society already had been reviewed by the critical intergovernmental committee in these matters—the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC)—and these became the basis for a wide range of proposed reforms in occupied Japan. As the Borton-Blakeslee group and SWNCC saw it, disarmament was but one aspect of the task of ensuring a peaceful Japan in the future, for true demilitarization required "democratization" as well. The fundamental assumption here was that the repressive structure of the prewar Japanese state had created a "will to war" (as Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson phrased it shortly after Japan surrendered), whereas democracies—by which was meant bourgeois democracies with a thriving middle class—did not practice oppression.[11]

The initial U.S. Occupation policy of demilitarization and democratization rested on such sweeping assumptions. In the many instances where the policy directives emanating from Washington were couched in broad and somewhat ambiguous terms, moreover, MacArthur and his staff in Tokyo tended to interpret them as a mandate for genuinely drastic reform, on occasion of a more radical nature than Washington seems to have had in mind. MacArthur's prestige and messianic style, coupled with the Eurocentrism of the Truman administration, gave the Occupation staff in Japan unusual leeway for approximately two years, until the latter part of 1947. And although the general may have fumed about liberal programs in his homeland under President "Rosenfeld," as he reportedly was wont to call his former commander in chief, as a

reformer in the Japanese milieu MacArthur proved to be exceptionally receptive to the recommendations of a small coterie of American liberals and New Dealers. Some of the most dramatic and consequential reforms carried out under the early democratization program, such as the sweeping land reform of 1946–47 and the new constitution promulgated in 1946, actually were given their radical edge in MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo.

By almost every appraisal at the time, the early democratization program as a whole was fundamentally progressive. War criminals were brought to trial. Some two hundred thousand alleged militarists and ultranationalists were purged from public life. On the economic front, in addition to the land reform, laws were enacted in support of labor unionization and the right to strike; the oligopolistic *zaibatsu* holding companies were dissolved; and policies were announced calling for economic deconcentration, industrial demilitarization, and severe reparations to Japan's war victims. Politically, even the Communist Party was made legal, and "grass-roots" democracy was to be promoted through police decentralization, educational reform, and the strengthening of local autonomy. Under the new constitution, which went into effect in early 1947, the emperor became a "symbol" of the state, the country renounced the resort to war as a means of solving disputes, and the people of Japan were granted a broad array of rights that in some instances (such as explicit acknowledgement of the equality of women) went beyond U.S. constitutional guarantees. In the realm of demilitarization more prosaically defined, Occupation authorities moved quickly to repatriate and demobilize the Imperial army and navy, destroy military stocks, and abolish the entire military establishment. Their zealousness was such that, in one of the more notorious excesses of the demilitarization program, apparently on instructions from the War Department, they smashed the great cyclotron in the "Riken" laboratory in Tokyo and dropped the pieces in the ocean.[12]

There were, to be sure, exceptions to the sweeping demobilization program that seem noteworthy in retrospect. Reliance on the Japanese for minesweeping in the waters around Japan, for example, preserved the nucleus around which a future navy could be reconstructed. The military "demobilization boards" themselves kept remnants of the Imperial army and navy employed and provided a body of records that proved

useful later when the decision was made to create a new Japanese military beginning in 1950. Certain Japanese staff officers found a new home in the U.S. Occupation bureaucracy itself, especially the Counter-Intelligence Section (G-2), where they were employed in such tasks as preparing historical accounts of the recent war. Many Japanese officers were "debriefed" as a matter of course, and in one appalling instance—involving officers and scientific researchers in the murderous "Unit 731," which had conducted lethal medical and biological-warfare experiments on prisoners of war in Manchuria (killing an estimated three thousand in the process)—blatant war criminals were granted immunity from prosecution in return for disclosure of their special knowledge. Outside Japan, in parts of both China and Southeast Asia (especially the French- and British-controlled areas), the repatriation of scores of thousands of Japanese soldiers was delayed for months and sometimes even years, as many of these unfortunate pawns found themselves enlisted to fight against indigenous communist or national liberation movements.[13]

In the light of Japan's later remilitarization, these exceptions to the demobilization and demilitarization program are suggestive and perhaps symbolic. At the time, however, they did not reflect the main thrust of U.S. strategic policy. In fact, for reasons that still remain somewhat obscure, this first stage of U.S. policy toward occupied Japan witnessed a rare occurrence: the literal putting into practice of rhetorical promises, namely, the promise of imposing "complete and permanent disarmament" upon Japan. This took the form of Article Nine of the new Japanese constitution, which, in its final form (after passing through MacArthur's headquarters, the Japanese cabinet's experts, the Japanese parliament, and a parliamentary committee), read as follows:

> ARTICLE 9. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.
>
> In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

The precise genesis of Article Nine is one of the tantalizing puzzles of the Occupation. At the same time, the whole process of constitutional revision in occupied Japan is an excellent example of the ambiguity of U.S. policy for Asia in the immediate postwar years and of the way this ambiguity often enabled MacArthur and his staff in Tokyo to promote their own ideals. In one of the earliest basic documents sent to Tokyo to guide MacArthur (SWNCC 150/2 of August 1945), the objective of "complete and permanent" disarmament of Japan was reiterated. In a later policy document that suffered some untidy revision at the hands of the multinational Far Eastern Commission sitting in Washington (SWNCC 228 of January 1946), however, the concept of total and permanent demilitarization was muddied by reference to future prerogatives of the *civilian* branch of the Japanese government. MacArthur's command thus received mixed instructions on this critical issue. Indeed, on the issue of constitutional change in general it received no blueprint but only a general mandate for revision. The first draft of the new Japanese Constitution was composed in English in the Government Section of MacArthur's headquarters, in a hectic and heady two-week period at the beginning of February 1946. Specialists on occupied Japan disagree on whether the idea of the "no war" clause originated with MacArthur himself or with one of the key officers in the Government Section (Charles Kades or Courtney Whitney), or possibly even with the then Japanese prime minister, Shidehara Kijūrō. No matter who may have been responsible for the original idea, however, it is clear that Article Nine originated in Tokyo and never would have become part of the national charter of Japan without MacArthur's blessing.

The "no war" clause of the draft constitution caught Washington by surprise and provoked the aforementioned discussion of Japan as a future *place d'armes* in 1946. By and large, however, Article Nine did not cause consternation in Washington, for it not only crystallized wartime promises concerning the complete and permanent disarmament of Japan but also was consistent with plans that were then being drafted in the State Department for the long-term (meaning twenty-five to forty years) international supervision of a disarmed Japan. No major planner in Washington prior to 1947 envisaged the serious rearmament of Japan in the near future, and those few who speculated that this might be desirable

later simply assumed that it would be relatively easy to amend Article Nine.[14]

The survival of the "spirit of Article Nine" as an abrasive feature of the subsequent relationship between Japan and the United States is the greatest and most ironic legacy from this first stage of postwar relations between the two countries—the irony lying in the fact that the American-generated "no-war clause" became the symbolic as well as legal rallying point for Japanese who opposed America's later reversal of policy on the issue of Japanese rearmament. At the same time, another major feature of the eventual, bilateral military arrangement also had emerged at a very early date, namely, the decision that the Bonin and Ryukyu islands (including Okinawa) would be treated differently from the rest of Japan. Top-level U.S. planning in 1945–1946 did not project the long-term maintenance of U.S. military bases in the four main islands of Japan, but from the very end of the war the Bonins and Ryukyus were singled out as being of critical strategic importance to the United States, although it apparently was not until 1948 that Okinawa became formally designated as one of the three major bases "from which to launch a strategic air offensive employing atomic weapons."[15]

THE SOFT COLD WAR POLICY, 1947–1949

On the first anniversary of Japan's surrender, General MacArthur announced that the Japanese people already had undergone a "spiritual revolution" that "tore asunder a theory and practice of life built upon two thousand years of history and tradition and legend." If the nation continued to pursue the great middle road of democracy, it soon would emerge as a "powerful bulwark for peace." Six months later, in March 1947, MacArthur informed a press conference that the time had come to end the Occupation and permit Japan to fulfill this destiny. As was often the case, the supreme commander's grand pronouncement had a highly personal and subjective underside, for at this juncture MacArthur had his eye on the impending presidential primary elections in the United States, in which he hoped to emerge as the Republican candidate. The March call for an early peace with Japan coincided closely with the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine for Europe and served as impetus

to a flurry of activities that can be described most charitably as the peace-treaty charades of mid 1947. In the course of public and private debate over the prospects of an early peace with Japan, U.S. officials really began for the first time seriously and systematically to consider Japan's future role in the Cold War.

Four aspects of the peace-treaty flurries of mid 1947 seem especially noteworthy. First, it became apparent that State Department planning for a future peace settlement with Japan remained in the mold of World War II thinking. The basic draft peace treaties for Japan that were being worked on within the department at this time (under the direction of Hugh Borton) were extremely long, and bristled with provisions for post-treaty international supervision and controls over "sovereign" Japan. They amounted, in a word, to a "punitive" peace.

Second, despite the cumbersome and still tentative nature of these internal drafts, the State Department responded to public pressure in July 1947 by calling for an international conference on Japan that (1) was scheduled for a time when Britain and the Commonwealth nations already had prior commitments, and (2) was procedurally unacceptable to the Soviet Union, because in the Soviet view it ignored prior understandings that these matters would first be considered by the wartime "Big Four" (the United States, Soviet Union, Britain, and China) before being submitted to a larger multinational forum. These procedural issues became a cause for charges of bad faith on all sides, and in this setting for the first time U.S. officials and politicians considered the notion that it might be appropriate to anticipate a "separate peace" with Japan—that is, a peace settlement on terms that would be unacceptable to the Soviet Union.[16]

In a third related development, the Japanese—including not only government officials but also the presumedly "symbolic" and nonpolitical emperor himself—took the initiative to convey to the Americans their willingness to accept some sort of separate peace arrangement if necessary. These secret Japanese proposals, which in many respects anticipated by roughly four years the broad contours of the San Francisco settlement of 1951, hinted at a bilateral military agreement with the United States and the development of Okinawa as a major U.S. military bastion. To scholars of the Occupation, these activities are of interest for a number

of reasons. They call attention to the positive Japanese contribution to the policymaking process; offer an unusually vivid case study of politicking by the emperor through his personal advisers; and reveal that both the Japanese government and Imperial Household were willing from an early date to trade away true sovereignty for Okinawa in exchange for an early end to the Occupation in the rest of Japan. As many Japanese critics see it, the special treatment accorded Okinawa beginning right after the war—its intense militarization and Americanization—makes it proper to see post–World War II Japan as a "semi-divided" country. Moreover, the Japanese ruling groups, as the record now clearly indicates, did little or nothing to prevent this from happening. On the contrary, they were all too willing to use Okinawa and its people, who have always been regarded as second-class citizens, as bargaining chips.[17]

Finally, the peace-treaty issue of 1947 focused attention on Japan and drew a new group of U.S. planners into the picture, many of whom hitherto had been preoccupied with policymaking for Europe. Even as the United States publicly was blaming the Soviet Union for impeding progress on a peace settlement with Japan, these new national-security advisers were arguing behind the scenes not only that the Borton group's draft treaty was totally outdated but also that an early peace with Japan was out of the question. The United States itself was unprepared to talk concretely about a peace settlement with Japan in mid 1947, and it is for this reason that its public gestures to the contrary can only be described as a charade.

Over the course of the next several years, the vision of a disarmed and neutral Japan remained a potent one in the public arena, partly because of General MacArthur's continued reaffirmation of this ideal. Although the supreme commander's presidential aspirations had been dashed by a stunning defeat in the Republican primary election in Wisconsin in April 1948, he remained very much in the public eye and as zealous a proselytizer as ever concerning the dream of turning Japan into a unique symbol of peace in the modern world. In his scenario, Japan's "disarmed neutrality" would be protected by the positioning of United Nations forces in key Pacific islands, including Okinawa. MacArthur's famous description of Japan as the "Switzerland of the

Pacific" actually was made as late as March 1949, but by then time had passed him by. Still, whether out of pacifist ideals or, more commonly, lingering fear and mistrust of Japan, few American officials were ready to rush pell-mell into the wholesale rehabilitation of Japan as a Cold War ally.[18]

In Washington, the most articulate spokesmen for the new vision of Japan included the State Department's George Kennan and high civilian bureaucrats in the Department of the Army led by Secretary Kenneth Royall and Under Secretary William Draper. The "Kennan touch" was first applied to Japan policy in a decisive way in October 1947 in a paper on the peace-treaty issue for the State Department's Policy Planning Staff (PPS 10). The position set forth there became the basis for the National Security Council documents that governed Japan policy in 1948 and into 1949 (the NSC 13 series), and covered a wide range of sensitive policy issues. Kennan and his aides opposed an early end to the Occupation, partly on the grounds that Japan's present economic instability made it ripe for communist penetration, and they foresaw the possibility of having to impose peace terms "unilaterally" later. While recognizing the necessity of long-term U.S. military control of certain islands peripheral to Japan, as well as of at least the northern part of Okinawa, PPS 10 indicated that the long-term presence of U.S. forces in the main four islands of Japan might not be necessary. The paper also proposed that any future peace treaty with Japan should avoid post-treaty supervision but at the same time reaffirm the principle of complete Japanese disarmament. The Kennan group also recommended that the reparations program should be terminated quickly to end uncertainty and to stimulate capital investment and economic recovery.[19]

By June 1948, this policy had evolved into NSC 13 ("Recommendations with Respect to U.S. Policy toward Japan"). This called for a brief, general, and nonpunitive peace treaty in the indefinite future; reaffirmed the necessity of maintaining long-term military control over not only Okinawa but also the great naval facilities at Yokosuka (south of Tokyo) as well, but deferred decision on post-treaty bases throughout the four main islands; advocated strengthening the Japanese "police"; and announced a shift in Occupation priorities from reform to economic recovery.[20]

While this broad policy directive was worming its way to the surface in the National Security Council, numerous economic studies and proposals that addressed the economic reconstruction of Japan in more concrete terms were piling up on the desks of the national-security managers. As early as March 1947, an important internal State Department report known as the Martin Plan called attention to the changing nature of the world economy and the impending "dollar gap" crisis in Asia. With this in view, the report argued, it was desirable to promote Japan's future economic stability by actively developing its capacity to export capital goods to the nondollar markets of Asia.[21]

The Martin Plan was important as an early intimation of many economic considerations that would emerge as dominant over the course of time: recognition of Japan's heavy dependence on U.S. aid, fear that the dollar-poor countries of Asia would collapse unless more sophisticated patterns of interregional integration were developed, and the perception that in the future Japan would have to rely more on the export of machine goods and the like than on the export of textiles and light-industrial products as in the prewar period. In return for such exports, Japan would import raw materials and cheap manufactures from the less developed countries of Asia.

Similar arguments came from other directions. Almost simultaneously with the Martin Plan, for example, the army received an economic report from MacArthur's Economic and Scientific Section in Tokyo that also recommended curbing inflation and attaining a "balanced Japanese economy" by cutting down the reparations program and promoting Japanese production of capital goods earmarked for export. These prospects were thrown into the arena of public debate in a famous speech by Dean Acheson on May 8, in which the then–assistant secretary of state, with his gift for the sharp aphorism, linked Europe with Asia while separating the Cold War from the old war—all in a single stroke. There was no getting around the fact, Acheson declared, that Japan and Germany had to be developed as the "workshops" of Asia and Europe, respectively. How this was to be done, and how extensively and how rapidly, was debated within both the civilian and military bureaucracies in the months that followed, resulting in a small flood of reports and position papers that became the basis for swinging Congress behind the policy of promot-

ing Japanese economic reconstruction in 1948. In June 1948, under the new Economic Recovery in Occupied Areas program, Congress appropriated $108 million that, for the first time, could be used specifically for economic recovery in occupied Japan. That same month Congress also approved a Natural Fibers Revolving Fund (PL 820) totaling $150 million that eventually was used to support massive exports of American raw cotton to Japan—a pump-priming program with obvious sectional appeal in Congress, although it did not reflect the emerging emphasis on promoting growth in Japan's nontextile sectors.[22]

As NSC 13 revealed, by 1948 the question of the future military disposition of Japan was being addressed on three levels: Okinawa, post-treaty U.S. bases in the rest of Japan, and Japanese rearmament. Okinawa by this time was explicitly identified as the primary forward base in U.S. nuclear strategy in the Far East. While the importance of continued U.S. access to the airfields in the rest of Japan was publicly discussed by top officials such as Draper, no formal decision had been made on this. And the issue of Japanese rearmament had been raised but shelved, emerging only obliquely in NSC 13 in the context of strengthening Japanese police forces against potential internal subversion.

Many formerly classified documents confirm that by 1948 the defense establishment was pushing fairly firmly in the direction of long-term U.S. bases in Japan and Japanese rearmament. As early as the spring of 1947, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) had identified Japan as the one country in Asia capable of holding the "ideological opponents" of the United States at bay while a major offensive was waged in the West. For that reason, the military planners observed, "of all the countries in the Pacific area Japan deserves primary consideration for current United States assistance designed to restore her economy and her military potential." Secretary of Defense James Forrestal requested a study of limited military rearmament for both Japan and Germany in February 1948, and by May had received a lengthy and extremely frank response under the name of Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall, in which the army planners not only supported post-treaty bases and constitutional revision that would permit future Japanese rearmament but also went on to emphasize the importance of developing new markets and sources of raw materials for Japan abroad. Nonetheless, when this document came before the JCS in October (accompanied by a copy of MacArthur's

views opposing rearmament), the rearmament of Japan was rejected as impractical under present circumstances. The rearmament policy was not approved until early 1950 and not actually urged upon the Japanese government until June 22 of that year—three days before the outbreak of the Korean War.

Certain military officers did openly proclaim their desire to enlist the Japanese as an active military ally from an early date. For example, in 1948 General Robert Eichelberger, commander of the Eighth Army in Japan (who had described the Japanese enemy as "monkeys" in his wartime letters), publicly called for a Japanese army of 150,000 men. Such men, he said, would be the sort of military force every commander dreams of leading—an appalling and terrifying remark to the rest of Asia. In the internal documents of this period, however, even those who were advocating "limited military rearmament" for Japan took care to emphasize the necessity of controlling and restraining whatever remilitarization might be allowed. Distrust of Japan remained a conspicuous feature of this second stage of U.S. planning.[23]

In what ways, then, was the Cold War policy of this second stage "soft" in comparison with the eventual San Francisco settlement? In the case of long-term bases in Japan and Japanese rearmament, the answer is obvious: neither policy had yet been adopted by the U.S. government, and both still had strong and persuasive critics (including Kennan and most of his State Department colleagues, as well as MacArthur and many of his key aides). In addition, despite the fact that Japan was now identified as the future "workshop" of Asia—and despite vague references to a Marshall Plan for Asia—the soft policy did not offer a coherent vision of regional anticommunist economic integration in Asia. On the contrary, it was assumed until 1950, and in some U.S. and Japanese circles even later, that Japan would and should establish substantial economic ties with China, no matter what regime controlled the mainland. No positive steps were taken to integrate Japan and Southeast Asia until much later; and no concrete, systematic attempt to stabilize the Japanese economy and to gear industry for export production was actually undertaken until January 1949, when the Detroit banker Joseph Dodge arrived in Tokyo to initiate the famous (or, to some, notorious) "disinflation" policy known as the Dodge Line. Although reparations policy began to be watered down beginning in 1947, the formal "post-

ponement" of this program, which was so inhibiting to prospective Japanese investors and entrepreneurs, did not occur until May 1949. Indeed, NSC 13 itself was not approved by President Truman until October 1948 (as NSC 13/2), and well into the spring of 1949 policymakers in Washington still were lamenting that there had been virtually no progress in its actual implementation.[24]

Perhaps most striking, the soft Cold War policy minimized the overt threat of Soviet aggression against Japan and instead emphasized the possibility of Japan's "going communist" because of its own internal instability. As Kennan and others were quick to emphasize, Japan appeared extremely precarious economically and thereby politically precarious as well. Inflation was out of hand; lingering uncertainty over Occupation policy in the areas of reparations and economic deconcentration stifled capital investment; foreign trade, stymied by Occupation controls, hardly existed; and labor, caught in the inflationary spiral, appeared to be moving in an increasingly radical direction. In one of the more ideologically entertaining vignettes from this period, the "liberal" Kennan visited Japan in early 1948 and concluded that the "conservative" MacArthur was promoting policies conducive to communism. It was this vision of Japan as economically unstable and thereby ripe for communization *from within* that motivated the abandonment of some of the initial democratic and reformist policies of the Occupation and the adoption instead of policies conducive to capitalist stabilization and reconstruction.[25]

This nervous and occasionally even apocalyptic vision of Japan as economically vulnerable, politically unstable, and ideologically unreliable was especially unsettling because it coincided with the enunciation in U.S. circles of an absolutely fundamental thesis: that Japan was the key to the balance of power in Asia. Beginning around 1948, this balance-of-power argument was developed roughly as follows: (1) Japan, with its skilled manpower and great industrial and war-making potential, was the critical power in Asia. (2) In grand global terms, however, Asia ranked neither first nor even second in strategic importance to the United States. On the contrary, the European theater took priority, followed by the Near and Middle East. In military terms, this called for a "strategic offense in the West and strategic defense in the East." (3) In this global scheme, Japan was more important to the Soviet Union than to the

United States. (4) Consequently, the primary U.S. objective where Japan was concerned was not to make Japan a part of the U.S. offensive capability but rather, more simply, to keep Japan out of the Soviet sphere.

This concept of the *negative* importance of Japan (the need to "deny" it to the enemy) meant that even apart from any positive contribution to U.S. objectives, the United States never could conceive of "writing off" Japan, for this would mean incalculable gain for the Soviet Union. John Foster Dulles later became fond of citing a phrase attributed to Stalin in 1925 to buttress this line of thinking ("The way to victory over the West is through the East"), and the concept was repeated again and again in the U.S. policy papers prior to 1950. As late as December 1949, for example, one of the basic papers pertaining to Asia (NSC 48/1) observed that "if Japan, the principal component of a Far Eastern war-making complex, were added to the Stalinist bloc, the Soviet Asian base could become a source of strength capable of shifting the balance of world power to the disadvantage of the United States." Even more succinctly: "The Asian power potential is more valuable to Russia than to the United States." An analysis by the Central Intelligence Agency dated May 1949 spelled the same thesis out in fuller detail:

> Control of Japan's industrial machine would be more valuable to the USSR than to the US, not only because the USSR has more immediate need of the products of Japan's industry but also because the USSR will be in effective control of the area (chiefly northern China, Manchuria and Korea) whose natural resources Japanese industry can utilize most efficiently. For this reason, long-range US security interests dictate the denial of Japan's capacity, both economic and military, to USSR exploitation. . . . The difficulties and cost to the United States of making Japan the center of a Far Eastern war-making complex, and the fact that Japan's industry—measured in terms of realizable steel production—is only 5 percent of US, probably would make denial of the Japan complex to the USSR, rather than full exploitation of Japanese industry as an auxiliary to US war production, the dominant US strategic consideration. Japan's industrial plant would be of much greater positive value to the USSR than to the US; it would,

in fact, be for the Soviet Union the richest economic prize in the Far East.[26]

To call such a policy "soft" is not meant to minimize either its dynamics or its impact on the attentive public. The British and Chinese (of all political persuasions), as well as the Soviets, voiced concern about the specter of Japanese remilitarization beginning in early 1948, and before the end of that year the Soviets were citing Western press accounts in their denunciations of what they termed the U.S. military policy of surrounding China with a "defensive ring" stretching through Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, Siam, Burma, and India. In the United States, a small, well-organized, and highly effective "Japan lobby" had emerged by 1948 under the name of the American Council on Japan, with excellent access to government, Congress, business and financial circles, and the media. And in Japan itself, the shift from reform to reconstruction was signaled by antilabor actions beginning in 1947 and, in 1948, the near-abandonment of one of the central announced policies of the demilitarization and democratization agenda: enforcement of a vigorous program of economic deconcentration.

Because of a variety of technical and political complications, the policy of democratizing the Japanese economy by eliminating excessive concentrations of economic power was almost stillborn. The basic enabling legislation for deconcentration was not even enacted until December 1947, by which time it already was wreathed in controversy. Although 325 companies were designated for investigation and possible reorganization in February 1948, by mid April the policy had been almost completely reversed and Occupation authorities were instructed that banks were to be totally excluded from the purview of the law and, in the words of a confidential internal memorandum, "no more than twenty companies were to be subject to reorganization under the law and these were to be chosen on the basis that they were interfering with Japanese economic recovery." By July, 225 of the 325 designated firms had been removed from designation, and eventually only eleven of the original 325 companies were ordered to split and another eight to make minor organizational changes. One of the members of a Deconcentration Review Board composed of U.S. businessmen sent to Japan in May 1948

to terminate the program expressed the prevailing sentiment in a memorandum that described the antitrust legislation as "bordering on (if not actually) the methods used by so-called communist States today." In the words of one of the original supporters of the program, written as these events unfolded, "Facts of the last war faded . . . and conjectures on the next war took their place."[27]

Although the archival record concerning the decision to abandon the economic democratization program contains the usual good portion of blunt and colorful confidential quotations, it is more important to keep in mind that this reversal of policy was plain for all to see. It flew in the face of Acheson's old "will to war" hypothesis concerning the structural roots of Japanese aggression, while giving concrete meaning to his more recent vision of the Japanese "workshop." And, every bit as much as the specter of a remilitarized Japan, it caused alarm and protest through most of the rest of Asia.

THE HARD COLD WAR POLICY, 1949–1951

The reconsideration of policy toward Japan obviously occurred at a time when U.S. officials were becoming profoundly pessimistic about trends elsewhere in Asia. In essence, they were envisaging the old Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (including Japan itself) turning Red and being harnessed to the Soviet Union: references to a "Communist Co-Prosperity Sphere" or to communist-influenced "Pan-Asiatic tendencies" actually appear in U.S. documents from this period.[28] At the same time, U.S. officials now also were beginning to think explicitly of Japan's role in a future global conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union—and from this it was only a short step to the logical next stage in strategic planning: the notion that it was not only necessary to deny Japan to the enemy but also essential to incorporate Japan in a positive manner in the U.S. Cold War strategy. When this step was taken, it marked the end of the soft Cold War policy.

The "hard" or "positive" Cold War policy line involving Japan can be dated from June 1949, when, shortly after Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson had called for a coordinated policy "to contain communism" in Asia, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted a strong and controversial