What exactly is externalism or anti-individualism about mental content? What is the main argument Burge provides in favour of the view? Why does Fodor think externalism is incompatible with the kinds of explanations we need to offer in scientific psycho
8. REFERENCES AND FURTHER READING
Burge. T. 1979 ‘individualism and the mental,'(expert) in French, Uehling and Wettstein (eds) Midwest studies in Philosophy, IV, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp73-87 (reprinted in Burges foundations of mind OUP 2007
Fodo, J. 19080 ‘Methodological Solipsism considered as a research strategy in cognitive psychology’ in behavioural and brain sciences 63-79
Recommended Reading:
Putnam, H. 1975. ‘The Meaning of “Meaning”’, in K. Gunderson (ed.) Minnesota
Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 7, Language, Mind and Knowledge, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
Burge, T. 1982. ‘Other Bodies’, in A. Woodfield (ed.) Thought and Object: Essays on Intentionality, Oxford, Clarendon Press. (Reprinted in Burge’s Foundations of Mind, OUP 2007.)
Fodor, J. 1987. ‘Individualism and Supervenience’ in Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind, MIT Press: ch. 2.hilosophy of Mind
Introductory Reading:
Fodor, J. 1987. ‘Preface’ in Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind, MIT Press.
Kim, J. 2011. ‘Mental Content’ in Philosophy of Mind 3rd edn, Westview Press: ch. 7.
Segal, G. 1998. ‘Methodological individualism’ in E. Craig (Ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge. URL http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/W022.
Lau, J. & Deutsch, M. 2010. ‘Externalism About Mental Content’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/content-externalism/.
Science Reading:
Burge, T. 1986. ‘Individualism and Psychology’ Philosophical Review 95 (1): 3–46.
(Reprinted in Burge’s Foundations of Mind, OUP 2007.)
Gopnik, A. & J. W. Astington. 1988. ‘Children’s Understanding of Representational Change and Its Relation to the Understanding of False Belief and the Appearance-Reality Distinction’ Child Development 59(1), pp. 26-37.
